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Abstract
We specify an oligopoly game, where ￿rms choose quantity in order to
maximise pro￿ts, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-
seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an
oligopsonistic market for in￿ uence. Alternative speci￿cations of the strategic
variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent
dissipation.
1 Introduction
There are many strategic interactions where agents spend resources to dispute some
rent or prize. Beginning with the work of Tullock (1967), a large literature, often
referred to as the economics of contests, has arise to examine this type of strategic
interaction. Konrad (2004) provides a useful summary. One of the most important
examples is that of elections, where the resources allocated to campaigning determine
candidates￿probability of election (Congleton 1986). Other examples include the
analysis of patent races, where ￿rms compete by spending a certain amount of money
that determines the probability that they make a discovery and win the race (Loury
1979, Nalebu⁄ and Stiglitz 1983), elimination tournaments (Rosen 1986), and the
analysis of litigation by assuming that the parties compete by choosing how much
to spend on their legal challenge (Farmer and Pecorino 1999).
It is normally assumed in this literature that the probability distribution of
outcomes is determined by a success function, with a vector of e⁄ort or expenditure
levels as arguments. Most commonly, the probability of a particular candidate being
elected (or the success probability more generally) is modelled as the ratio between
this candidate￿ s expenditure and the total expenditures of all candidates. However,
a range of di⁄erent success functions has been considered. Given a speci￿cation of
the e⁄ort variable, and the success function, the problem is typically represented as
a non-cooperative game. The solution is a Nash equilibrium, with expenditure as
the strategic variable for each player.
1A notable feature of the contest literature is the absence of explicit markets, and
therefore, of considerations of industrial organization.1 It is widely recognized in
informal discussion of electoral contests that political contestants may be regarded
as entrepreneurs trading in markets for votes, but this insight plays little role in
contest-theoretic models of elections.
In this paper it is argued contests should be viewed, not as a separate category
from imperfectly competitive markets, but as oligopsonistic markets for in￿uence.
The in￿ uence variable may be interpreted as electoral support, legal expertise, con-
nections within labour markets and so on. Competition between players determines
an implicit price for in￿ uence, and therefore the expenditure required to acquire a
given level of in￿ uence. In our framework, the standard Tullock solution corresponds
to a Nash equilibrium for ￿rms with market shares as the strategic variable analyzed
by Grant and Quiggin (1994).
The isomorphism between contests and oligopoly games has an important im-
plication in this respect; it suggests that the exclusive focus of the Tullock contest
literature on e⁄ort or expenditure of resources as the strategic variable might be
misleading. There is an obvious contrast with oligopoly models, where both prices
and quantities (Bertrand or Cournot models) were considered as possible strategic
variables even before the game theory revolution that has dominated the ￿eld of
industrial organization over the last three decades. More recently, a number of pa-
pers have proposed alternative strategic variables, such as supply curves (Klemperer
and Meyer, 1989) and markups (Grant and Quiggin, 1994). In addition, there have
been numerous attempts to motivate the choice of particular strategic variables, for
example as outcomes of a multistage game (Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983). These
issues have received little or no attention in the contests literature.
In our main result, we show that alternative choices of the strategic variable
can yield a range of equilibrium outcomes, from Cournot to Bertrand. As markets
for in￿ uence become more competitive, the implicit price of in￿ uence increases and
the net rent shared by purchasers of in￿ uence decreases. Thus the analogy between
contests and markets is not merely formal, but suggests a range of economic insights.
The determination of the strategy space is of particular interest where the contest
market is the product of conscious mechanism design, with the strategies available
to players speci￿ed by the designer. This point arises naturally when contests are
considered as all-pay auctions as in Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1996). An auction
is conducted under a set of rules, which specify the strategies available to the players,
and which may be designed to maximize expenditure, to allocate the auctioned item
to the player with highest value, or to promote some more general objective such as
1Okuguchi (1995) and Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) show that the standard formulation
of the Tullock rent-seeking game, where individuals choose e⁄ort or resources to win a prize, is
strategically equivalent to a Cournot oligopoly game where the elasticity of demand is unitary and
￿rms choose quantity to maximize their pro￿ts. This formal identity is used to derive an existence
proof, but its implications for the interpretation of contest-theoretic results have received little
attention.
2social e¢ ciency.
If contests may be viewed as a kind of imperfectly competitive market, it is
natural to consider the implications of treating imperfectly competitive markets as
a particular kind of contests. This idea has been considered (Fudenberg and Tirole
1987) but there does not appear to have been a systematic consideration of the
implications of contest theory for industrial organization. We consider this topic
brie￿ y before o⁄ering some concluding comments.
2 Contests as Markets for In￿ uence
Our starting point is the most well-known model of contests, namely, the Tullock
rent-seeking game. This class of games can be represented by a set of n players,
who choose e⁄ort levels e1;e2;:::;en in order to win a prize of ￿xed value V , and a
parameter R > 0. E⁄ort levels may be considered as producing a quantity variable,
qi; where the cost function is given by ei = ci(qi). Player i￿ s payo⁄ in this class of
games is given by:






The equilibria for this family of games (both symmetric and asymmetric, pure and
mixed-strategy) are well-known.2
As Okuguchi (1995) and Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) show, a standard







is strategically equivalent to a Cournot oligopoly game with inverse demand function,













2See, for example, Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1994). Importantly, Baye and Hoppe (2003)
show that this family of games is isomorphic to certain innovation and patent-race games. It
follows then that our main result also applies to these other classes of games. That is, there are
isomorphisms between oligopoly games and speci￿c innovation and patent-race games.
3and cost functions of the form ci(qi) = g￿1 (qi). If ci is convex and twice di⁄eren-
tiable for all i Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997) demonstrate the existence of an
equilibrium in pure strategies.
In this paper, we take a di⁄erent approach to the idea that individual behavior
in Tullock contests may usefully be related to the behavior of ￿rms in imperfectly
competitive markets. To pursue this idea further, it seems natural to consider
more carefully the idea, familiar from public-choice theoretic discussions of political
processes, that contests represent a particular kind of market, namely a market for
in￿ uence. If this analogy is taken seriously, the participants in contests may be
regarded as buyers in oligopsonistic markets. To formalize the idea, we need to
de￿ne concepts analogous to prices, quantities, and supply schedules.
To address this task, we introduce the idea of a price of in￿ uence which is given





where ￿i is the in￿ uence acquired by player i and p is the unit price of in￿ uence. In
the electoral case, for example, we might adopt the interpretation that p is the price
paid by the candidates for each vote and ￿i the total number of voters induced to
vote for candidate i. Accordingly, the expenditure for player i is
(2) ei = p￿i;i = 1;2:::n:











where we assume, for simplicity, that R = 1 and the prize is normalized to one so
that i￿ s payo⁄ is given by ￿i ￿ ei: One can immediately see that such context is
essentially isomorphic to a oligopsony game as described below.






ei, i = 1;:::;n; is
strategically equivalent to a oligopsony game where:
(i) the strategic variable for ￿rm i is the quantity purchased of an
input xi > 0;
(ii) output is given by the production function f(xi) = xi;
(iii) the (constant) output price is A ￿ 1






4Proof: Each ￿rm i chooses xi to maximize pro￿ts, which can be written as:


















Then replace xi with ei. ￿
As in the analysis of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997), changes in the suc-
cess function for the Tullock contest are isomorphic to changes in the production
technology for the oligopsonistic ￿rm. We will not develop this point, but instead
will focus on the choice of strategic variable. The representation of Tullock con-
tests as markets for in￿ uence, given in equation (2) suggests three possible choices
for strategic variable for player i: the total expenditure ei as in Proposition ??,
the quantity of in￿ uence ￿i; corresponding to a Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium and the
price of in￿ uence p; corresponding to a Bertrand equilibrium. It is natural to ask
how alternative speci￿cations of the strategic variable a⁄ect the proportion of rent
dissipated in the contest.
The analogy with oligopoly can help us to answer this question. Grant and
Quiggin (1994) show that the equilibrium outcome with revenue as the strategic
variable is less competitive (higher price, lower aggregate quantity, higher pro￿t)
than the Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium. This is because (loosely speaking) if one player
chooses to deviate by increasing revenue, this entails an increase in their own output
and a reduction in the market price, and the Nash assumption that other players will
hold revenue constant implies that they must increase quantity. Converse reasoning
for the oligopsony case suggests that the outcome of a standard Tullock contest
with expenditure as a strategic variable will be more competitive (lower price, higher
aggregate quantity, more rent dissipation) than the Cournot￿ Nash equilibrium. This
is because an increase in expenditure by one player raises the market price, and
therefore lowers the equilibrium quantity associated with a given expenditure level.
To verify this we ￿rst remind the reader that in the standard analysis of Tullock
games, player i chooses ei to maximize (1). The unique (symmetric) Nash equilib-
rium is well-known and given by e￿
i = n￿1
2n = e￿ for i = 1;:::;n: To see this, note
that n￿1





(e1+(n￿1)e)2 ￿ 1 = 0. This






Second, consider the Cournot￿ Nash strategic representation where the candi-
















































Finally, we consider a strategic representation of markets for in￿ uence that is
equivalent to a ￿ Bertrand￿model of oligopoly. Under this scenario the candidates
compete for voters in the ￿ prices￿space. We impose the standard assumptions in
Bertrand competition, where the voters will vote for the candidate who o⁄ers the
higher price. In the event that both candidates o⁄er the same price, voters are
equally split among the two candidates. It is not di¢ cult to see that the Bertrand
(auction) logic implies that in equilibrium:
p
B
1 = ::: = p
B
n = 1:
That is, any price lower than one leads to ￿ undercutting￿ . Under this equilibrium,
there is zero pro￿t, that is, full rent dissipation, as
(6) ￿
B







1 = ::: = e
B
n:
We summarize this discussion as follows:
Proposition 2 Consider the following strategic variables for a market for in￿uence
(i) Expenditure ei (Tullock)
(ii) Quantity of in￿uence ￿i (Cournot)
(iii) Price of in￿uence p (Bertrand)
Rent dissipation is higher under Bertrand than under Tullock and higher under
Tullock than Cournot. Bertrand yields full rent dissipation, regardless of the success
function.
The discussion suggests that by considering the full range of strategies available
to participants in Tullock contests, it is possible to obtain a wide range of symmetric
equilibrium outcomes, just as in the case of oligopoly.
3 Determining the strategy space
In the literature arising from Tullock (1967), a large amount of e⁄ort has been de-
voted to analyzing the implications for equilibrium outcomes of alternative speci￿ca-
tions of the contest success function and payo⁄function. The analysis of strategically
6asymmetric contests presented above shows that the speci￿cation of the strategy
space is equally important.
The ￿rst possibility is that there exist institutional rules or structures, exogenous
to the players that determine the strategies available to them. This is typically the
case for actual games of strategy, such as chess; the players are exogenously assigned
the White or Black pieces, and the rules of the game specify the strategies available
to them.
Second, a one-shot normal-form contest representation of an economic interaction
may be derived as the reduced form of an extensive form representation, analogous
to the oligopoly models of Dixon (1986) and Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
Finally, the strategy space for a contest may be the product of conscious mecha-
nism design. For example, in economic environments such as auctions, the strategies
available to bidders are speci￿ed by the party holding the auction. A sealed-bid all-
pay auction gives rise to a Tullock contest, with bid values as strategies, in which
the success function awards the prize with probability 1 to the highest bidder (Baye,
Kovenock, and de Vries 1996). But the vendor need not choose this auction struc-
ture. Other auction rules, specifying di⁄erent strategy spaces, may yield higher
expected revenue, though normally at the cost of ine¢ ciency in allocation of the
good (Klemperer 2002).
Similarly, the hierarchical structure of the internal labour markets is the product
of design decisions by the owners or senior managers of the ￿rm, possibly constrained
by the interventions of unions, governments or other stakeholders. It seems plausible
to suppose that owners would prefer contest structures that maximized e⁄ort by
employees, while managers would have mixed incentives.
As has been shown here, the determination of the strategy space is crucial in
determining the outcome of contests. However, this issue has received little attention
in the literature on contests. If the strategy space cannot validly be ￿ read o⁄￿from
the structure of the game, and, in particular, from the formulation of the success
function, it is necessary to examine the economic structure of the contest.
Consider, as an example, the possible takeover of a company with shares that are
initially widely held, but where a majority owner could obtain a control premium.
Depending on their own ￿nancial structure, the organization of the market and the
regulatory environment, potential acquirers might pursue a variety of strategies.
We will focus on three possibilities: acquirers might choose expenditures on the
acquisition project; a price they are willing to pay for control; or a quantity of
shares to purchase in anticipation of a proxy war.
In the standard Tullock contest model, the ￿rst of these strategy spaces is as-
sumed to apply. However, as shown above, acquirers as a group would prefer the
second strategy space, which involves less dissipation of rent. If members of a set of
acquirers interacted repeatedly, it would be in their joint interest to set up institu-
tions that facilitated contests of this kind. By contrast, regulators seeking to protect
the interests of shareholders in general might prefer a requirement for acquirers to
compete on price.
73.1 Imperfectly competitive markets as contests
The interpretation of contests as taking places in markets, which is a⁄orded by the
proposition above, may be turned around. Participants in oligopolistic markets may
be considered as taking part in a contest for market share. In the case where the
elasticity of demand is unitary, this interpretation is represented by the isomorphism
given above. More generally, oligopolistic markets may be considered as analogous
to contests where the strategic choices of the players determine both the value of
the prize (total revenue) and the probability of winning (market share).
One important implication of the contest literature, which has received only
limited attention in the industrial organization literature, is that, in determining
the rent accruing to participants, the cost function is just as important as the choice
of strategic variable. Depending on the cost function, any outcome in the range
from perfect competition to joint monopoly pricing may be sustained as a Cournot
equilibrium.
The interpretation of oligopolistic markets as contests reinforces a centra point
of this paper. The mere fact that an economic interaction can be represented as
being (or being isomorphic to) a contest gives no warrant for any particular choice
of strategic variables.
4 Concluding comments
In economic terms, a contest may be regarded as taking place in an imperfectly com-
petitive market for in￿ uence. Understanding of the relationship between contests
and imperfectly competitive markets is hampered by the absence of explicit prices
and quantities in the standard contest model. When contests are represented as mar-
kets for in￿ uence, we derive a natural strategic equivalence between the standard
Tullock contest and an oligopsonistic market in which expenditure is the strategic
variable. Unlike the corresponding case for oligopoly, this outcome turns out to be
less competitive (and hence less dissipative of rent) than the Cournot solution.
In this paper, we have shown that the standard Tullock contest game is strategi-
cally isomorphic to an oligopsony game in which input expenditure is the strategic
variable. Consideration of this isomorphism indicates some di⁄erences in the as-
pects of the problem considered in the literature on contests, on the one hand, and
on imperfectly competitive markets on the other. Analysis of contests has focused
on di⁄erences in the success function (equivalent to di⁄erences in the production
technology for the oligopsony case), while the literature on imperfect competition
has paid more attention to the determination of the strategic variable. In each
case, a range of possible outcomes from complete rent dissipation to sharing of the
maximum rent may be obtained in appropriate cases.
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